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This paper builds upon the empirical literature on the macroeconomic impact of real exchange 
rate depreciations for a sample of 27 emerging economies. We find that real exchange rate 
depreciations tend to increase a country’s risk premium. This effect is neither linear nor 
symmetric: large real exchange depreciations are much more detrimental and real appreciations 
do not seem to reduce the risk premium. We also show that the main channels for the real 
exchange rate to affect country risk are external and domestic balance sheet effects, stemming 
from the sudden increase in the stock of external or domestic dollar-denominated debt, 
respectively. This is particularly the case in the countries with the largest financial 
imperfections. Competitiveness is not an important enough factor to outweigh this negative 
effect. Finally, fixed exchange rate regimes tend to amplify balance sheet effects, beyond the 
extent of real depreciation. The data indicates that it could be due to a larger accumulation of 
external debt under fixed regimes.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
During the second half of the 1990s emerging countries have experienced very large swings in 
the external cost of capital as well as several financial crises, with a large impact on economic 
growth. For this reason, academics and practitioners interested in emerging economies are 
paying increasing attention to the determinants of a country’s risk premium. An important one is 
the real exchange rate, since it is particularly volatile in emerging regions, as compared to 
industrial ones. Besides, there is a strand of literature exploring the direct link between real 
exchange fluctuations and economic performance, which can serve as a basis to analyze the 
relation between the real exchange rate and the risk premium. 
 
Conventional open economy models, and in particular the influential Mundell-Fleming, argue 
that real depreciations have an expansionary effect by switching global demand towards 
domestic production. Already in 1986, Edwards (1986) challenges this view on several grounds: 
the possible contractionary effect of a higher price level after a devaluation as well as a potential 
negative impact on income distribution. He also finds some evidence of a small contractionary 
effect for a sample of 12 developing countries. More recently, theories based on what has 
started to be known as the open economy Bernanke-Gertler-Gilchrist financial accelerator, have 
challenged the Mundell-Fleming view. If a country’s debt is denominated in foreign currency, a 
real depreciation will reduce the country’s net worth through a balance sheet effect and, in the 
presence of financial imperfections, may increase the cost of capital.  This is particularly 
relevant for emerging economies given their relatively large share of foreign currency 
denominated debt, the frequency of large real depreciations and the presence of financial 
imperfections. 
 
In an earlier work, Berganza, Chang and García Herrero (2003) develop a simple theoretical 
framework to understand the relation between balance sheets –stemming from the increase in 
the external debt service after a real depreciation – and a country’s risk premium and find 
evidence a positive relation between the two. This could have several policy implications, such 
as the need to reduce foreign currency indebtness and/or limit, to the extent possible, financial 
imperfections. It could also have implications for the choice of the exchange rate regime since 
avoiding real exchange rate depreciations becomes crucial for a country’s cost of credit.  
 
Given the relevance of the matter, it seems worthwhile investigating the issue further. In 
particular, we would like to understand why – and under which circumstances- balance sheet 
effects increase a country’s cost of borrowing. Among these questions we shall study: (i) 
Whether real exchange depreciations are detrimental for country risk; and to what extent and   3
under which circumstances this is the case. (ii) Whether real exchange appreciations are 
beneficial. (iii) Which are the channels of influence of a real depreciation on country risk; in 
particular, whether “domestic” balance sheets, stemming from the increase in domestic foreign 
currency denominated debt after a real depreciation are as important as “external” balance sheet 
effects. (iv) What is the role of competitiveness, as the most important channel in the traditional 
literature of the expansionary effects of real depreciations. (iv) Whether balance sheet effects 
are influenced by the existence of financial imperfections, as one would expect from the 
financial accelerator literature. And, finally (iv) Whether the exchange rate regime plays a role 
in how balance sheets affect country risk, beyond the extent of real depreciation.   
 
Investigating these issues will help us delimit the extent to which emerging countries should 
worry about real depreciations, depending on their own characteristics. In the same vein, it 
should contribute to identifying which are the most appropriate policy actions to minimize this 
problem. 
 
2.  REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Most theoretical models on the impact of balance sheet effects draw from the open economy 
version of the financial accelerator, developed by Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2003). They 
generally show that balance sheet effects, related to a sudden reduction in net wealth, are 
detrimental either in terms of the cost of capital or output. However, this result hinges on the 
existence of financial imperfections. Given these conditions, the ultimate answer to the question 
of whether balance sheet effects are detrimental and when will be an empirical one. 
 
To our knowledge the only work which deals with this issue at the macro level is that of 
Berganza, Chang and García-Herrero (2003), who find that balance sheet effects –stemming 
from the increase in the external debt service after a real depreciation – raise a country’s risk 
premium for emerging economies. As for firm-level data, Forbes (2002) analyzes the impact of 
12 major depreciations on a sample of emerging countries’ large firms and finds no significant 
balance sheet effects on performance although firms with higher debt ratios tend to show lower 
net income growth. It should be noted, though, that Forbes does not take into account the 
currency composition of debt. In the same vein, Bleakley and Cowan (2002) show evidence that 
the competitiveness effect associated with exchange rate depreciations offsets the potential 
contractive balance sheet effect on investment for a panel of Latin American firms. The authors, 
therefore, conclude that there is no severe currency mismatch of output and liabilities in their 
sample. This optimistic result should, however, be taken cautiously, since no country fixed 
effects are considered and Brazilian firms account for half of the observations. In fact, when   4
each country is analyzed separately, always with firm-level data, there is evidence of 
detrimental balance sheet effects on investment in some countries (namely, Colombia, Mexico 
and Peru) but not in others (Brazil, Chile)
2. Furthermore, a macroeconomic empirical analysis, 
such as ours, may offer a more pessimistic picture of balance sheet effects in as far as it is not 
only the tradable sector which is considered but the whole economy. This has fewer possibilities 
to hedge its negative wealth in foreign currency than the group of large firms considered in the 
firm-level empirical studies. 
 
3.  OBJECTIVE OF THE PAPER 
 
The objective of this paper is to investigate, at the aggregate level, whether and in which way 
real exchange rate depreciations increase a country’s risk premium, with particular attention to 
balance sheet effects. To this end, a number of questions are analyzed.  
 
The first is whether an exchange rate depreciation increases a country’s risk premium and 
under which circumstances this is the case.  In principle, this should happen if balance sheet 
effects more than counterweigh the expected increase in competitiveness associated with a real 
depreciation. The question is why it is so for some countries and not for others. Identifying these 
differences is not an easy task but certainly interesting for policy makers, so as to know to 
which extent they should worry about real depreciations.  
 
A second interesting question is whether the impact of real exchange rate depreciations 
and appreciations is symmetric.  An asymmetry – whereby appreciations had no significant 
impact – would make the volatility of the real exchange rate more of a cause of concern for  
policy makers since there would be no instance to benefit from it (i.e., from appreciations). 
Financial accelerator theories argue in favor of an asymmetric effect of changes in net wealth 
since agency problems may only be binding when the debtor’s situation worsens (Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1989). Another reason for such an asymmetry could be drawn from the literature on 
liquidity constraints, which should only be relevant when a sudden increase in indebtness occurs 
and not when there is a net worth gain. A related question is whether the extent of a real 
depreciation affects the risk premium more than proportionally; that is, if its impact is non-
linear. If the answer is yes, this may have a bearing on the choice of the exchange rate regime 
since there may be no need to worry about small depreciations but only about large events.  
Such non linearity could be expected on the basis of the same arguments as before since large 
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changes in net worth should make financial and liquidity problems much more binding than 
relatively smaller ones.   
 
The third question relates to the channels through which real exchange depreciations 
affect the risk premium. The most well known channel, the gain in competitiveness, should 
reduce the risk premium the more open a country is to trade. The other crucial channel is that of 
balance sheet effects, stemming from a sudden reduction in net financial wealth.  In the case of 
emerging countries, it seems safe to think of negative net financial wealth because of the 
generally large stock of debt that they have accumulated. In the financial accelerator literature, 
however, balance sheet effects hinge on the existence of financial imperfections, which we also 
need to test for. One interesting issue for policy makers is whether all balance sheets are the 
same; in other words, whether an increase in the stock of foreign currency-denominated debt 
held by non residents (“external” balance sheets) can have the same detrimental effect on the 
risk premium as an increase in the stock of foreign currency-denominated debt held by residents 
(“domestic” balance sheet effects). If the former were larger, this would be an argument in favor 
of increasing a country’s domestic indebtness, even if in foreign currency, as compared to 
external indebtness.
3 The rationale behind a lower cost of domestic balance sheet effects may be 
that having residents as holders of a country´s dollar liabilities, these will benefit from a real 
depreciation compensating, at least partially, the loss of wealth of the borrowers. In other words, 
the real depreciation will have distributional effects but will not necessarily reduce net financial 
wealth, as for external balance sheets. The extent of the wealth effects of domestic balance 
sheets may depend on what resident creditors do with their wealth gain. If they are uncertain 
about repayment and/or the economic situation deteriorates sharply, they may opt for capital 
flight, eliminating the positive impact of the wealth gain on domestic spending or investment. 
The extent to which they reinvest their additional wealth may actually hinge on the existence of 
financial imperfections.  
 
The fourth question relates to the existence of financial imperfections, a crucial condition 
for balance sheet effects to be relevant in the financial accelerator theories. Given that our 
sample is composed of emerging countries, one could argue that they all suffer from financial 
imperfections. However, the degree to which this is the case varies from country to country. 
This is why it seems worth testing whether the countries with larger imperfections are also those 
who suffer from larger balance sheet effects. In addition, the role of financial imperfections 
could be different for domestic and external balance sheets. On the one hand, one could argue 
that external creditors are less affected by financial imperfections if the external debt is issued 
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outside the country, but it is also true that the sovereign debtors have the power to change the 
rules of the game even in this case. In addition domestic creditors may be better informed of 
their rights, or possible changes in their rights. 
   
The fifth and final issue is the role of the exchange rate regime on how balance sheets 
affect country risk, beyond the extent of exchange rate change. Several authors have 
developed this idea theoretically but no empirical test exists yet. Based on the financial 
accelerator literature, Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2003) argue that fixed exchange regimes 
amplify balance sheet effects because they force the central bank to adjust interest rates in a 
manner that enhances financial distress. Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2000) show that flexible 
exchange rates play an insulating role in the presence of real external shocks so that they output 
and investment fall by less than under fixed exchange regimes. The channel is the higher 
expected real depreciation under a pegged regime, and thereby the increase in interest rates, 
since policy makers will tend to maintain the exchange rate regime during a relatively long 
period so as to minimize the size of the change in the relative prices. Another idea for pegged 
exchange rate regimes to be detrimental for financial fragility is that agents tend to feel more 
protected from exchange rate risk and do not hedge against it (Burnside, Eichenbaum and 
Rebelo (2001)).  In this line, Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003) and Broda and Levy-Yeyati (2003) 
argue that a pegged exchange regime may induce dollar-denominated indebtness, and financial 
dollarization in general, because it can be taken as an implicit insurance by the private sector, as 
well as a demonstration effect from the part of the government that the exchange rate regime is 
credible and will be maintained.
4 On the other hand, Elekdag and Tchakarov (2004) show that 
fixed regimes can be superior for countries with a high level of indebtness and whose monetary 
policy is constrained. This is, therefore, a question worth tackling empirically. We interact each 
country’s exchange rate regime with external and domestic balance sheets, and test whether 
their detrimental effect on the risk premium is larger for fixed regimes.  Both de-jure and de-
facto regime classifications are used. 
 
4.  DATA ISSUES AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
The focus on the country as a whole and, thus, the use of macroeconomic data substantially 
limits the number of observations for this study. This is even more the case given the difficulties 
of proxying our dependent variable, country risk. The most widely used proxy in the literature 
are the returns implicit in the Emerging Markets Bond Indices (Embi) provided by JPMorgan, 
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after having subtracted total returns of US treasury bonds
5 (from now onwards this variable 
shall be named Embi). Appendix II offers details on variable definitions and data sources. The 
choice of the Embi, together with the condition we impose that at least four observations of 
Embi returns exist, limits our sample to 27 emerging economies and to the period 1993 to 2002 
for most countries (for some countries the timeframe is even shorter). This yields an unbalanced 
panel with a total of 210 annual observations (Table 1 in Appendix I).  
 
The geographical distribution of the observations among regions can be found in Table 2 in 
Appendix I. All major emerging regions are represented although Latin America is 
overweighted (with 9 countries and 71 of the observations) and the Middle East is 
underweighted. 
 
Apart from the dependent variable (Embi), the focus of this study is the change in the real 
exchange rate. Two different measures are calculated: The first is relevant for foreign currency 
indebtness, namely the bilateral nominal exchange rate against the US dollar adjusted by the 
domestic inflation (Real Exchange Rate Change). We use the bilateral exchange rate since we 
assume that all foreign currency debt is denominated in US dollar. This is a relatively safe 
assumption for the countries in our sample. The second measure is relevant for competitiveness, 
namely the effective real exchange rate against the major trading partners (Multilateral Real 
Exchange Rate Change).  
 
The other crucial concept is that of balance sheet effects, which stem from a reduction in 
financial net wealth after a real depreciation. In emerging countries we can safely assume that 
financial wealth is negative and corresponds with the increase in the stock of foreign currency-
denominated debt. In other words, although we use a concept of gross (negative) financial 
wealth, net financial wealth is bound to be negative, although probably smaller. The main 
difference probably lies in the size of international reserves, which we shall include as a 
robustness exercise. Our results do not change. Another interesting issue is whether what 
matters to measure balance sheet effects is the change in the stock of debt, because of the 
depreciation, or the change in the amount a country needs to pay on that year (the debt service). 
We shall use the stock of debt as first option, since it is more in line with the concept of net 
wealth in the financial accelerator literature, but robustness test will be conducted with the debt 
service. The results do not change.  
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We differentiate between domestic and external balance sheet effects. External Balance Sheets 
are composed by the foreign-currency denominated debt held by non residents at the end of the 
previous period (External Debt_1) multiplied by the Real Exchange Rate Change. In turn, 
Domestic Balance Sheets are composed of the foreign-currency denominated debt held by 
residents at the end of the previous period (Domestic Debt_1) multiplied by the Real Exchange 
Rate Change. We take the previous period to avoid mixing quantity effects, stemming from new 
indebtness from t-1 to t, with price effects, from the real exchange rate change. The best 
available proxy for Domestic Debt for the sample of countries in this study,
6 are the banking 
system’s dollar denominated deposits. De Nicoló, Honohan and Ize (2003) and Levy-Yeyati 
(2004) argue that the banking system’s dollar denominated deposits should be very close to the 
banking system dollar-denominated credit to the private sector. In fact, prudential regulations 
generally oblige banks to maintain very small open positions in foreign currency. In addition, 
banks’ dollar denominated credit to the private sector should practically be equal to the total 
domestic indebtness of the private sector in foreign currency except for the dollar-denominated 
debt this sector may issue domestically. This is bound to be negligible in most emerging 
countries. As for the case of External Debt, Domestic Debt is a gross concept of (negative) 
financial wealth since the private sector can hold assets in foreign currency and not only 
liabilities. The difference between the two, however, is that External Debt includes all sectors of 
the economy and Domestic Debt only the private sector. In any event, it seems reasonable to 
think that public sector will also have negative wealth in foreign currency held by residents. 
 
Financial imperfections are proxied by a variable measuring the quality of the institutional 
setting affecting the risk of investment (Creditor Rights). It is the sum of three subcomponents: 
contract viability or expropriation, profits repatriation and payment delays. Since this definition 
of creditor rights is more oriented towards external creditors, we can consider it as a ceiling for 
the creditor rights of domestic creditors in as far as emerging countries generally give priority to 
external debt payments in case of difficulty.   
 
Competitiveness, the other relevant channel of influence of real exchange rate depreciations, is 
measured by the interaction of a country’s openness (Openness) and the change in the effective 
real exchange rate (Multilateral Real Exchange Rate Change). 
 
As regards the exchange rate regime, we use both de facto and de jure classifications. In the 
former,  the underlying exchange rate regime is inferred from the observed exchange rate 
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movement. The classification by Rogoff and Reinhart (2004) is the preferred option since it 
allows us to keep a larger number of observations than other classifications, such as Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenneger (2003). The de jure classification is based on the IMF Annual Reports 
on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. Given the data limitations, we opt 
for grouping the classification into three broad ones: fixed, intermediate and flexible regimes 
(See Appendix II for details). 
 
Finally, a number of control variables are included in all specifications. The first is the lag of the 
sovereign risk (Embi_1), to account for its persistence, as will be shown later. The second is the 
Embi spread for all emerging countries for which it is available (Emerging Embi). This should 
capture a possible similar co-movement stemming from the market integration of this asset class 
and potential contagion effects. At the same time, this control variable allows us to pick up 
possible time effects in the regression. 
 
From the statistical tables in Appendix 1 (3, 4 and 5), some stylized facts are worth mentioning: 
First, the average of the Real Exchange Rate Change  is a small real appreciation, as opposed to 
a slight real depreciation in the case of the Multilateral Real Exchange Rate Change. Second, 
the average External Debt is around five times that of Domestic Debt. Third, the average Real 
Exchange Rate Change varies only slightly among different exchange rate regimes, both in the 
de jure and de facto classifications: De jure, flexible exchange rate regimes appreciate slightly 
on average while the other two depreciate; de facto, intermediate regimes appreciate slightly 
while the other two depreciate. As could be expected, the largest standard deviation is that of de 
facto flexible exchange rate regimes. These differences between classifications can be better 
understood comparing where each observation stands in the two classifications, as shown in 
Table 3 of Appendix 1. From the 203 available observations only 111 find themselves in the 
same exchange rate regime in the de facto and de iure classifications. 51 are more flexible de 
jure than de facto, which we could generally label as “fear of floating” cases. The remaining 41 
are more flexible de facto than announced, which in 16 of cases coincide with “freely falling” 
experiences of relatively fixed regimes, as labelled by Rogoff and Reinhart (2004).  
 
Finally, from the matrix of correlations in Table 4, Appendix 1, we can outline other 
characteristics of the data. First, the dependent variable (Embi) is very persistent (with a 
correlation of 0.71 between t and t-1). Second, the correlation between Embi and either the Real 
Exchange Rate Change or the External Debt, and therefore External Balancesheet, is positive, 
in line with the a priori of the financial accelerator literature. However, the correlation betwen 
Embi and ∆External Debt is negative, which hints at the idea (confirmed later in our results)  
that it is not so much the new external indebtness that matters for country risk, but the sudden   10
increase in the stock of external debt due to a real depreciation (in other words, the balance 
sheet effect and not the quantity effect).  Third, while the correlation between Embi and 
Domestic Debt is negative but very close to zero, that between Embi and Domestic Balancesheet 
is positive and relatively high (higher than for External Balance sheet). Only judging from these 
correlations, we should expect a negative net wealth effect also in the case of domestic balance 
sheets and not only for external ones. Fourth, the fact that the correlation between External Debt 
and  Domestic Debt is close to zero seems to indicate that there is no clear pattern of 
complementarity or substitution between the two. Finally, as one would expect, the quality of 
Creditor Rights, ∆Exports and Openness are negatively correlated with the dependent variable 
but, contrary to the theoretical literature, the degree of Competitiveness (i.e., the product of 
Openness and Real Exchange Rate Change) is positively correlated. 
 
As for the empirical strategy, we opt for a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), following 
Arellano and Bover (1995). We prefer this option to using OLS so as to (i) remove unobserved 
time-invariant country-specific effects; (ii) account for the potential endogeneity arising from 
the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in addition to other possibly endogenous right-
hand side variables (particularly the real exchange rate); and (iii) deal with the possibility that 
the dependent variable is not stationary. The second reason is particularly important since there 
might be instances of reverse causality (from country risk to the real exchange). The GMM 
empirically strategy allows us to take our results on safer grounds.  
 
The Arellano-Bover estimator, or GMM system estimator combines the regression expressed in 
first differences (lagged values of the variables in levels are used as instruments) with the 
original equation expressed in levels (this equation is instrumented with lagged differences of 
the variables)
7. The disadvantage with this empirical strategy, though, is the relatively small 
number of observations while the conditions to use GMM should be complied with 
asymptotically. As a robustness test, we run all regressions in OLS, with robust standard errors. 
The results remain unchanged.  
 
5.  RESULTS 
 
(i)      The net impact of real exchange depreciations and appreciations 
As a first step, it seems important to confirm whether real exchange rate depreciations raise a 
country’s risk premium. Controlling exclusively for the persistency of the risk premium 
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(Embi_1) and the evolution of the asset class (Emerging Embi), a statistically significant 
positive relation is found between the change in the real exchange rate and the risk premium 
(Table 1, column I)
8. Although this first approximation is very general and does not specify the 
channels through which the real exchange rate influences country risk, the result could be 
understood as a net effect. Such negative relation, more in line with the recent open-macro 
financial accelerator models than with the more traditional literature, offers a warning signal to 
emerging countries, which often suffer from real exchange rate depreciations.  
 
It seems interesting to test whether the effects of real exchange rate changes on a country’s risk 
premium are symmetric, in other words, whether real appreciations lower the country risk 
premium in the same way as real appreciations raise it. As Table 1, column II indicates, real 
exchange rate appreciations (Appr*Real Exchange Rate Change) do not seem to contribute to 
reducing country risk since we cannot reject the hypothesis that their coefficient is equal to 
zero
9. This result is in line with the models of financial imperfections, which expect detrimental 
effects of balance sheets only for negative shocks to productivity, based on the argument that 
agency problems may only be binding on the down side (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). Another 
plausible explanation are liquidity constraints. The asymmetric impact of real depreciations and 
appreciations may has an important policy implication: other things given, it should make 
emerging countries more reluctant to allow for fluctuations in the real exchange rate, not being 
able to profit from the “good times” (real appreciations) while suffering from the bad ones (real 
depreciations, particularly if sharp) . In particular, a real exchange depreciation of one 
percentage point has an immediate impact on the risk premium of 25 basis points. 
 
The question is whether the impact of a real exchange rate depreciation is linearly proportional 
to the size of the latter. In other words, whether it is the same in terms of the country’s risk 
premium to experience small depreciations over time or a sudden large real one. Our results 
offer a negative answer. Table 1, column III shows evidence of an non-linear effect of real 
exchange rate depreciations, accounted for as the square of this variable, and the country risk 
premium. 
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9 It should be noted that the asymmetry is a short-run effect, which may disappear in the long run. If the 
current coefficients could be interpreted as long-run ones (dividing them by one minus the estimated 
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Table 1: Impact of real exchange rate changes on the country risk premium 
1/ 
Specifications I II III
Number of obs 183 183 183
Embi_1 0.78 *** 0.64 *** 0.68 ***
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
Emerging Embi 0.64 *** 0.33 * 0.39 **
(0.18) (0.18) (0.17)
Real Exchange Rate Change 1533.62 **
(606.38)
Appr * Real Exchange Rate Change  (β1) -97.28 120.95
(604.54) (649.11)
Diff Effect Dep *  Real Exchange Rate Change (β2) 2474.57 *** -892.38
(634.17) (623.40)






Appr Constant -62.98 -122.95
(114.57) (95.72)
Diff Effect Dep Constant -99.01 129.59 *
(85.62) (75.57)
Sargan test 25.56 (1.00) 22.49 (1.00) 19.69 (1.00)
Ho: β1+β2=0
(p-value)     0.00
H0 can be rejected
The dynamic panel estimation uses one step GMM system estimators with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
Standard errors in parenthesis (p-values for the Sargan tests).
Significance of coefficients: * at 10% ; ** at 5%; *** at 1%
Dependent variable: Embi
Lags dated t-2, t-3 and t-4 for Real Exchange Rate Change, Appr * Real Exchange Rate Change, Diff Effect Dep *  Real Exchange Rate Change 
and [Real Exchange Rate Change] 
2  were included as instruments.
 
1/ Results are maintained (i) using OLS with robust standard errors instead of GMM, (ii) including the debt service instead of the 
stock of debt, and/or (ii) subtracting a country’s international reserves to the stock of debt.  
 
Although real depreciations tend to be detrimental for a country risk premium, we find a few 
observations where the opposite is true. The question is what makes these cases different. As a 
tentative answer, since the small number of observations does not allow us to explore the issue 
more rigorously, we look at the commonalities in the observations in which exchange rate 
depreciations lead to a reduction in a country’s risk premium (23 out of a total of 75 
depreciations). We refer to this group as the optimistic case. Taking the general case as a 
benchmark (namely the 52 observations in which real exchange rate depreciations lead to an 
increase in the risk premium) and making them equal to 100, the optimistic case is characterized 
by a lower external debt (about 20% lower than in the general case), higher tradability (15% 
higher), and better creditor rights, all as expected (Figure 1). However, they also have a much 
higher domestic dollar-denominated debt (50% more on average than in the general case). It is 
important to notice that exchange rate depreciations are much smaller in the optimistic case, 
which mitigates the relevance of the previously mentioned differences. We shall analyze this 
issue in more detail later.    13
 
Figure 1: Characteristics of the optimistic case 









External Debt_1 Domestic Debt_1 Openness Creditor Rights Real Exchange
Rate Change  
1/ Real depreciations  reduce the cost of borrowing  
2/ Real depreciations increase the cost of borrowing. 
 
In the case of real appreciations, there are a few observations where we find the expected 
positive impact (i.e., a reduction in country risk). We call this the “optimistic case”, since it is 
not generally confirmed in our empirical results, and compare it with the “pessimistic one” 
(where real exchange rate appreciations increase the risk premium). As one would expect, the 
former has more debt (both external and domestic dollar denominated) so that it can profit more 
from its reduction in value after the appreciation. It is also less opened to trade, so that it is less 
damaged by the appreciation. Creditor rights are lower but this is probably a less relevant 
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Figure 2: Characteristics of the pessimistic case 







External Debt_1 Domestic Debt_1 Openness Creditor Rights Real Exchange
Rate Change  
1/ Real appreciations increase the cost of borrowing  
2/ Real appreciations decrease the cost of borrowing. 
 
(ii)  Channels for a real exchange depreciation to influence the risk premium 
We, now, specify the channels through which the real exchange rate may influence a country’s 
cost of borrowing, based on the existing literature. The most important ones might be balance 
sheet effects, from external and domestic dollar denominated debt, and competitiveness. Also 
financial imperfections could be a potential channel in as far as financial accelerator theories 
make balance sheet effects dependent on the existence of such imperfections. Focusing 
exclusively on the external debt, we find that the External Balancesheets after a depreciation 
clearly increase the risk premium while they are not significant after an appreciation. (Table 2, 
column I). The same result is found for Domestic Balancesheets (Table 2, columns II and III).
10 
The latter seems to indicate that domestic private sector indebtness in foreign currency has 
negative wealth effects and not only redistributive ones. In turn, competitiveness affects country 
risk symmetrically and in the expected direction (reducing it with a real depreciation and 
increasing it with an appreciation)
11.  Better creditor rights tend to lower country risk.  
                                                  
10 The significance of domestic balance sheets, after a depreciation, is weakened (from a level of 
significance of 1% to 10%) when both external and domestic balance sheets are included in the regression 
(Column III). This is probably due to the collinearity between the two variables (Table 5 in Appendix I 
show a correlation of 0.52) 
11 The correlation between External Balancesheet and Competitiveness is very high, pointing to 
collinearity problems. An analysis of the correlation between parameters confirms this problem. This is   15
 
Finally, we try to separate quantity effects from price ones by including in the regression the 
increase in external and domestic dollar denominated debt and export growth, all in US dollar. 
None of the quantity effects are found significant. In the case of external and domestic debt, this 
result can be understood as if the country risk premium were not affected by new indebtness but 
rather by the sudden reduction in net wealth, due to real depreciation. This is in line with 
financial accelerator theories. 
 
Table 2: Channels of influence of changes in the real exchange rate 
1/ 
Specifications I II III IV
Number of obs 179 152 152 122
Embi_1 0.65 *** 0.65 *** 0.61 *** 0.61 ***
(0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
Emerging Embi 0.25 * 0.20 0.15 0.25 ***
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16)
Appr * External Balancesheet -399.45 -427.05 -357.98
(776.30) (834.89) (1.036.92)
Diff Effect Dep * External Balancesheet 4917.25 *** 3324.59 ** 3496.77 ***
(1.567.73) (1.673.84) (1.737.62)
Increase External Debt -0.46
(1.89)
Appr * Domestic Balancesheet -466.38 -262.96 -583.40
(388.54) (497.92) (808.42)
Diff Effect Dep * Domestic Balancesheet 14455.44 *** 7826.11 * -1758.74
(2.111.46) (4.819.81) (4.752.85)
Increase Domestic Debt 0.02
(0.03)
Appr * Competitiveness 2205.09 ** 1846.57 ** 2096.28 ** 2277.10 *
(977.31) (784.68) (968.15) (1.246.20)
Diff Effect Dep * Competitiveness -5048.16 *** -898.91 -4062.94 *** -4441.31 ***
(1.792.62) (1.045.50) (1.500.05) (1.672.54)
Increase Exports -495.61
(311.58)
Creditor Rights -37.04 * -48.43 ** -47.41 ** -56.76 *
(21.30) (23.01) (21.44) (30.01)
Appr * Constant 283.62 393.01 * 428.82 * -7.90
(237.24) (227.28) (223.46) (46.84)
Diff Effect Dep * Constant -55.37 21.35 -18.03 480.10
(49.99) (55.48) (45.17) (291.02)
Sargan test
The dynamic panel estimation uses one step GMM system estimators with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
Lags dated t-2, t-3 and t-4 for Appr * External Balancesheet, Diff Effect Dep * External  Balancesheet, Increase External Debt, 
Appr * Domestic Balancesheet, Diff Effect Dep * Domestic Balancesheet, Increase Domestic Debt,
Appr * Competitiveness and  Diff Effect Dep * Competitiveness were included as instruments.
Standard errors in parenthesis (p-values for the Sargan tests).
Significance of coefficients: * at 10% ; ** at 5%; *** at 1%
6.96 (1.00) 11.98 (1.00)
Dependent variable: Embi
19.42 (1.00) 15.39 (1.00)
 
1/ Results are maintained (i) using OLS with robust standard errors instead of GMM, (ii) including the debt service instead of the 






                                                                                                                                            
why we shall exclude Competitiveness in the following regressions, substituting it for Increase Exports 
which accounts mainly for the quantity effect, as Exports are measured in dollars.   16
(iii)   How do financial imperfections influence balance sheet effects 
In the previous set of regressions we have found direct evidence of the detrimental effect of 
financial imperfections on the risk premium. However, financial accelerator theories consider 
financial imperfections more as a condition under which balance sheet effects can increase the 
cost of borrowing than as a separate channel.  To test this hypothesis, we interact each country’s 
financial imperfections –proxied with the quality of creditor rights – with balance sheet effects, 
both external and domestic. We separate countries in three groups, those with the best creditor 
rights, those with intermediate ones and those with the poorest. Balance sheet effects are clearly 
larger in the last group, followed by the intermediate one (Table 3, columns I and II, 
respectively). In particular, for Domestic Debt only do countries with the poorest creditor rights 
see their risk premium increase because of domestic balance sheet effects. In the case of 
intermediate creditor rights we cannot reject the hypothesis that domestic balance sheets have 
no effect on the risk premium or is even negative for good creditor rights (Table 3, bottom of 
Column III). This could be explained by the fact that domestic creditors in the countries with the 
poorest creditor rights do not trust the system enough to use – or keep – their additional net 
worth at home.   
 
 
   17
 
Table 3: Financial imperfections and the influence of external 
and domestic balance sheet effects on the risk premium 
1/ 
Specifications I II
Number of obs 174 151
Embi_1 0.78 *** 0.63 ***
(0.11) (0.04)
Emerging Embi 0.51 *** 0.49 ***
(0.18) (0.19)
Low Creditor Rights  *  External Balancesheet (γ1) 2514.32 ***
(867.58)
Diff Effect Medium Creditor Rights  *  Exteranal Balancesheet (γ2) -659.22
(882.47)
Diff Effect High Creditor Rights  *  External Balancesheet (γ3) -1483.08 *
(853.56)
Low Creditor Rights  *  Domestic Balancesheet (δ1) 15868.14 ***
(1.708.31)
Diff Effect Medium Creditor Rights  *  Domestic Balancesheet (δ2) -15148.19 ***
(1.901.49)
Diff Effect High Creditor Rights  *  Domestic Balancesheet (δ3) -18861.95 ***
(2.705.78)
Increase Exports -493.69 ** -440.31
(242.89) (343.59)
Low Creditor Rights Constant -37.79 86.13
(189.81) (166.94)
Diff Effect Medium Creditor Rights Constant -156.65 -237.62 **
(99.92) (119.19)
Diff Effect High Creditor Rights Constant -174.69 * -279.09 **
(109.67) (123.16)
Sargan test
Ho: γ1+γ3=0 Ho: δ1+δ2=0
(p-value)     0.01 (p-value)     0.46
H0 can be rejected H0 cannot be rejected
Ho: δ1+δ3=0
(p-value)     0.04
H0 can be rejected
The dynamic panel estimation uses one step GMM system estimators with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
Standard errors in parenthesis (p-values for the Sargan tests).
Significance of coefficients: * at 10% ; ** at 5%; *** at 1%
Dependent variable: Embi
20.25 (1.00) 17.33 (1.00)
Lags dated t-2, t-3 and t-4 for Low Creditor Rihgts *  External Balancesheet, Diff Effect Medium Creditor Rights *  External 
Balancesheet, Diff Effect High Creditor Rights * External Balancesheet, Low Creditor Rights *  Domestic Balancesheet, Diff Effect 
Medium Creditor Rights * Domestic Balancesheet, and Diff Effect High Creditor Rights *  Domestic Balancesheet were included as 
instruments.
 
1/ Results are maintained (i) using OLS with robust standard errors instead of GMM, (ii) including the debt service instead of the 
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(iv)  How does the exchange rate regime influence balance sheet effects 
After identifying when balance sheet effects are particularly a problem, we now analyze to what 
extent they are influenced by the exchange rate regime in place. This is particularly interesting if 
consider that the exchange rate regime is an important policy variable for the economic 
authorities.  
 
As previously mentioned, several theoretical models argue that a fixed exchange rate regime 
amplifies balance sheet effects on the risk premium, This is confirmed in our results, when 
interacting the exchange rate regime and domestic and external balance sheet effects. The 
exchange rate regime is lagged one period to avoid that what was originated by a certain regime 
is assigned to another one. We use both de iure and de facto classifications and compare the 
results. 
 
Starting with external balance sheet effects, fixed exchange rate regimes, de iure, amplify their 
detrimental impact on the cost of borrowing (Table 4, column III). This is so when compared 
with the average balance sheet effect, i.e., when the exchange rate regime is not considered 
(Table 4, column I).  The flexible regime is clearly superior since we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that external balance sheets under this regime leave the risk premium unchanged 
(Table 4, bottom of column III). When taking the de facto classification, fixed regimes are also 
the most detrimental (Table 4, column II), with a larger coefficient than the average case (Table 
4, column I). This time the differential effect of the flexible exchange rate is not significant but 
the intermediate one is clearly better than the pegged, although not to the extent of eliminating 
the detrimental effect of external balance sheets on the risk premium. In sum, although the 
results are relatively similar in the two classifications for the fixed exchange rate regime, this is 
not the case for the intermediate and flexible ones. One possible explanation is that the de facto 
classification has twice as many observations under the intermediate regime than the de iure 
classification. The opposite is true for flexible exchange rate regimes. This difference is 
probably explained by the well-known phenomenon of  “fear of floating”, as countries tend to 
announce that the exchange rate will move more flexibly than they actually allow for.    19
Table 4: The exchange rate regime and external balance sheets 
1/ 
Specifications I II III
Number of obs 178 170 177
DE FACTO DE IURE
Embi_1 0.78 *** 0.71 *** 0.73 ***
(0.13) (0.15) (0.12)
Emerging Embi 0.55 *** 0.59 *** 0.57 ***
(0.16) (0.14) (0.17)
External Balancesheet 2489.84 ***
(769.48)
Fixed_1 *  External Balanacesheet (Θ1) 3333.64 *** 3145.73 ***
(1.158.73) (1.226.52)
Diff Effect Intermediate_1 *  External Balancesheet (Θ2) -2741.70 ** -439.06
(1.283.98) (1.633.45)
Diff Effect Flexible_1 *  External Balancesheet (Θ3) -1844.16 -2488.72 **
(1.591.65) (1.244.84)
Creditor Rights -50.21 * -29.35 ** -44.53 **
(29.69) (12.18) (22.60)




Constant Fixed_1 147.72 238.28
(171.55) (276.96)
Diff Effect Intermediate_1 Constant  -140.66 ** -38.73
(66.87) (60.47)
Diff Effect Flexible_1 Constant -170.01 *** -128.84 **
(64.07) (58.78)
Sargan test
Ho: Θ1+Θ2=0 Ho: Θ1+Θ3=0
(p-value)     0.06 (p-value)     0.16
H0 can be rejected H0 cannot be rejected
The dynamic panel estimation uses one step GMM system estimators with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
Standard errors in parenthesis (p-values for the Sargan tests).
Significance of coefficients: * at 10% ; ** at 5%; *** at 1%
18.11 (1.000) 22.84 (1.000)
Dependent variable: Embi
23.20 (1.000)
Lags dated t-2, t-3 and t-4 for External Balancesheet, Fixed_1 * External Balancesheet, Diff Effect Intermediate_1 *  External Balancesheet, Diff Effect 
Flexible_1 *  External Balancesheet were included as instruments.
 
1/ Results are maintained (i) using OLS with robust standard errors instead of GMM, (ii) including the debt service instead of the 
stock of debt, and/or (ii) subtracting a country’s international reserves to the stock of debt.  
 
 
In the case of domestic balance sheets, pegged regimes are clearly worse on the basis of the de 
iure classification with double the coefficient than for the average case (Table 5, columns III 
and I, respectively).  Intermediate and flexible regimes are clearly superior since we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that balance sheet effects under any of these two regimes leave the risk 
premium unchanged (Table 5, bottom of column III). The differences among de facto regimes 
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Table 5: The exchange rate regime and domestic balance sheets 
1/ 
Specifications I II III
Number of obs 151 143 177
DE FACTO DE IURE
Embi_1 0.61 *** 0.54 *** 0.63 ***
(0.07) (0.12) (0.06)
Emerging Embi 0.43 ** 0.52 *** 0.51 ***
(0.18) (0.15) (0.15)
Domestic Balancesheet 8100.45 *
(4614.37)
Fixed_1 *  Domestic Balancesheet (ρ1) 6710.74 16319.13 ***
(5.110.24) (717.04)
Diff Effect Intermediate_1 *  Domestic Balancesheet (ρ2) -2323.34 -15153.64 ***
(5.545.48) (1.605.39)
Diff Effect Flexible_1 *  Domestic Balancesheet (ρ3) -674.53 -13334.29 ***
(9.472.57) (1.987.78)
Increase Exports -411.67 -236.83 -495.17
(374.42) (175.40) (332.18)




Constant Fixed_1 309.68 267.86
(156.25) (278.76)
Diff Effect Intermediate_1 Constant  -149.44 80.70
(104.02) (62.24)




(p-value)    0.41
H0 cannot be rejected
Ho: ρ1+ρ3=0
(p-value)    0.22
H0 cannot be rejected
The dynamic panel estimation uses one step GMM system estimators with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
Standard errors in parenthesis (p-values for the Sargan tests).
Significance of coefficients: * at 10% ; ** at 5%; *** at 1%
Dependent variable: Embi
20.32 (1.000) 17.51 (1.000) 15.10 (1.000)
Lags dated t-2, t-3 and t-4 for Domestic Balancesheet, Fixed_1 *  Domestic Balancesheet, Diff Effect Intermediate_1 * Domestic Balancesheet, and Diff Effect 
Flexible_1 * Domestic Balancesheet were included as instruments.
 
1/ Results are maintained (i) using OLS with robust standard errors instead of GMM, (ii) including the debt service instead of the 
stock of debt, and/or (ii) subtracting a country’s international reserves to the stock of debt.  
 
Given its policy implications, it seems worth exploring why it is the case that pegged regimes 
behave worse than others. As a tentative answer (since the small number of observations does 
not allow us to explore the issue more rigorously) we look at the commonalities in the 




Fixed exchange rate regimes tend to accumulate more external debt and domestic dollar-
denominated debt, as argued by Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003) and Broda and Levy-Yeyati 
(2003)
13. This is more the case in de facto than de iure classification (Figure 2 and 3)
14, which 
                                                  
12 The number of observations for each group can be found in Table 3, Appendix 1. 
13 This is the case not only in levels, as shown in Figures 3 and 4, but much more so when we look at the 
rates of change of external debt form t-1 to t.  This is not included in the graph because of the differences 
in scale.   21
might be explained by the fact that some of the announced pegged regimes are not expected to 
be maintained (in fact there are much fewer observations for de facto pegs than de iure). The 
same might be true for some of the intermediate regimes which are announced (particularly 
crawling pegs).  No clear trend appears for Domestic debt.  
 
Another plausible explanation, other than the accumulation of foreign currency debt, could be 
that real exchange rate depreciations are larger under fixed exchange rate regimes. As Table 3 in 
Appendix 1 shows, this is not the case either in the de iure or de facto classifications, since the 
observations under the pegged regime do not have the largest average real depreciation. It could, 
nevertheless, happen that pegs suffer more frequently from events of very large depreciations, 
which we have shown to be more detrimental. Looking at the 5% extreme values of the right tail 
of our distribution (i.e., the largest real depreciations), this does not seem to be the case. In fact, 
most of the extreme observations fall under intermediate regimes both in the de iure or de facto 
classifications. 
 
Figure 3: Characteristics of managed and flexible  



















                                                                                                                                            
14 In the specific intermediate regimes, de iure, domestic dollar denominated debt is actually lower.   22
Figure 4: Characteristics of managed and flexible  

















In sum, from this cursory exploration of the data, the most plausible explanation for the more 
detrimental balance sheet effects under pegged regimes is the relatively larger accumulation of 
dollar-denominated debt, coupled with the existence of poorer creditor rights, and not so much 
the accumulation of a larger depreciation or extreme depreciation events under pegged regimes. 
This is in line with the idea that fixed exchange rates tend to be perceived as an implicit 
insurance by the private sector and that public authorities may increase their dollar-denominated 
indebtness as a demonstration effect that the regime will be maintained.  
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
This paper builds upon the empirical literature on the impact of real exchange rate depreciations 
for the economy as a whole. In particular, it confirms Berganza, Chang and García Herrero 
(2003)’s finding of a positive relation between changes in the real exchange rate and a country’s 
risk premium for a sample of 27 emerging economies and explores additional questions to 
determine what makes balance sheet effects so detrimental for the risk premium.  
 
We show evidence that the effect of a real depreciation is neither symmetric nor linear. On the 
former, real appreciations are not found significant in reducing a country’s risk premium, while 
real depreciations clearly increase it. The immediate effect of a real depreciation of one 
percentage points is an increase in the country risk premium by 25 basis points. On the latter,   23
sharp real depreciations have much larger negative effects than smaller ones. This should make 
policy makers wary of real exchange rate volatility, particularly if large, since there is no period 
when they clearly benefit from it. There are, however, a few cases in our sample, where 
exchange rate depreciations reduce the risk premium. A cursory look at the characteristics of 
these observations points to the importance of having a relatively low level of external debt, 
higher trade openness and better creditor rights, for real exchange rate depreciations to be 
beneficial.  
 
We also show that the main channels for the exchange rate to affect country risk are external 
and domestic balance sheets, stemming from the sudden increase in the stock of external debt 
and domestic dollar-denominated debt after a real depreciation. In the case of domestic balance 
sheets, this can be interpreted as evidence of the presence of wealth effects and not only 
redistribution ones.  In addition, the same asymmetric impact is found for balance sheets as for 
the real exchange rate; that is, the reduction in the stock of foreign-currency debt after a real 
appreciation does not reduce country risk. On the contrary, the degree of competitiveness 
appears to have a symmetric effect – and with the expected sign – on country risk. In any event, 
The evidence of a positive and highly significant relation between the exchange rate change and 
country risk, which can be considered a net effect, indicates that competitiveness is not an 
important enough factor to outweigh the detrimental impact of balance sheets. New external and 
domestic dollar denominated indebtness is not found significant, suggesting that what matters is 
not so much the amount of new borrowing but rather the sudden reduction in net financial 
wealth because of a price change.   
 
When financial imperfections are considered (proxied by the quality of creditor rights) our 
results confirm the a priori of the financial accelerator literature: the poorer creditor rights are, 
the more external and domestic balance sheet effects increase the risk premium. Finally, fixed 
exchange rate regimes appear to amplify the negative impact of balance sheet effects on the risk 
premium. This seems to be related to the fact that pegged regimes have a bigger (and faster 
growing) stock of external debt, on average, and not so much to the extent of the real 
depreciation. The latter is not larger, on average, under this regime, not event the number of 
events of large depreciations, which have been found to be particularly detrimental through the 
result of non-linearity. A plausible explanation for the potential causal relation between a 
pegged regime and a larger external debt is that this regime is perceived as an implicit insurance 
by the private sector. In the same vein, public authorities may increase their dollar-denominated 
indebtness as a demonstration effect that the peg will be maintained.  
   24
In sum, a number of policy conclusions can be drawn from these results.  The volatility of the 
real exchange rate, especially if large, is something to worry about in emerging countries. This 
is because it tends to increase country risk, a key variable for economic growth, in an 
asymmetric and non-linear way. The main channels through which the real exchange rate affect 
the risk premium are external and domestic balance sheet effects and, to a lesser extent, 
competitiveness, in the opposite direction. Therefore, the countries that should worry most are 
those with small trade openness, large financial imperfections and pegged exchange rate 
regimes, which are associated with bigger and faster growing external indebtness. The 
combination of these three characteristics can make real exchange rate depreciations particularly 
detrimental for a country’s risk premium, an extremely important variable for emerging 
countries in need of external financing because of its strong impact on economic growth. Given 
that these three characteristics can be influenced by economic authorities, there is clear a role 
for policy action to mitigate the problem. 
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APPENDIX I :  
STATISTICAL ISSUES 
 
Table 1  
Countries and years included 



















Republic of Lebanon 1998-2002 5
Russian Federation 1997-2002 6
Slovakia 1993-2002 10
South Africa 1994-2002 9
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Table 2  






as a % of total 
sample
Asia 54 2 2 0 . 0
Latin America 97 1 3 3 . 8
Eastern Europe 64 8 2 2 . 9
Africa 64 4 2 1 . 0
Middle East 152 . 4




Table 3:  
Descriptive Statistics of the regression variables 
Variable No. Obs. Mean Std. Deviation Minimun Maximun
Embi 210 560.40 515.95 60.233 3925.75
Emerging Embi 210 617.47 143.61 352.72 1007.55
Real Exchange Rate Change 208 -0.019 0.1561 -0.8126 0.895
Fixed real exchange rate change de facto 55 -0.009 0.152 -0.319 0.895
Intermediate real exchange rate de facto 109 0.011 0.115 -0.257 0.415
Flexible  real exchange rate de facto 38 -0.036 0.231 -0.813 0.616
Fixed real exchange rate change de iure 73 -0.009 0.164 -0.448 0.895
Intermediate real exchange rate de iure 68 -0.012 0.167 -0.813 0.529
Flexible  real exchange rate de iure 67 0.0159 0.135 -0.266 0.415
Effective real exchange rate change 210 0.0044 0.1477 -0.3746 1,137
External Debt 209 0.5683 0.2589 0.1473 1,561
Increase External Debt 208 3.75 10.43 -17.43 41.66
External Balancesheet 207 0.0018 0.0928 -0.3071 0.6432
Domestic Debt 155 0.1132 0.2721 0 2,109
Increase Domestic Debt 143 69.68 478.83 -100 5091.47
Domestic Balancesheet 172 -0.0024 0.0248 -0.1485 0.163
Openness 208 0.3642 0.2107 0.05903 1,195
Competitiveness 207 -0.0017 0.0388 -0.1348 0.2254
Increase Exports 203 0.0714 0.1485 -0.3651 0.7998





Relation between the classification of de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes  
 
FIXED INTERM FLEXIB TOTAL
FIXED 41 25 5 71
INTERM 8 47 11 66
FLEXIB 6 37 23 66
TOTAL 55 109 39 203
DE FACTO
DE IURE




(111 Observations) Fear of flexibility
(51 Observations)
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Table 5: 
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APPENDIX II:  
DATA SOURCES AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Below we list the variables and sources used for this study, as well as the transformations made 
to the data. The data are annual and cover the periods and countries shown in Table 1. 
Dependent variable: 
* Embi Country risk premium or spread in the external cost of borrowing: equals returns for 
U.S. dollar-denominated Brady bonds, loans, Eurobonds, and U.S. dollar-denominated local 
markets instruments for emerging markets minus total returns for U.S. Treasury bonds with 
similar maturity (the stripped yields of the Emerging Markets Bond Index, Embi, for each 
country). The spreads are measured in basis points. 
Source: JP Morgan. 
Objective variables: 
* External Debt: equals the total debt in convertible currencies owed to nonresidents, as the 
end of the reporting year in U.S. dollars divided by the nominal GDP in 1995 in U.S. dollars, so 
as to take into account the relative size of the country. 
Source: The Institute of International Finance (IIF). 
* Domestic Debt: proxied by the domestic deposits in U.S. dollars divided by the nominal GDP 
in 1995 U.S. dollars to take into account the relative size of the country. 
Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
Levy-Yeyati (2004).  
* “Real” Exchange Rate: equals the average number of units of local currency per U.S. dollar 
during the year adjusted by the inflation price index (with 1995=1) divided by the nominal 
exchange rate in 1995. Thus, in 1995, Real Exchange Rate is equal to 1 and an increase 
(decrease) in Real Exchange Rate is a depreciation (appreciation). 
Source: IIF. 
*  Multilateral Real Exchange Rate: is an annual average index of the nominal effective 
exchange rate of the local currency with respect to six leading trading partners, deflated by the 
relative consumer prices. An increase (decrease) in Multilateral Real Exchange is a depreciation 
(appreciation) 
Source: IIF. 
* “Real” Exchange Rate Change: equals the changes in “Real” Exchange Rate between year t 
and year t-1. (∆ln “real” exchange rate).   31
*  Multilateral Real Exchange Rate Change: equals the changes in Multilateral Real 
Exchange between year t and year t-1. (∆ln effective real exchange rate). 
* Exports: equals the total value of export of goods and services to nonresidents, valued at 
market prices in millions of U.S. dollars.  
Source: IIF. 
* Openness: is defined as the ratio of Exports to the nominal GDP in 1995 U.S. dollars. 
Source: The IIF. 
* External Balancesheet: equals the product of External Debt in year t-1 and “Real” Exchange 
Rate Change between the years t-1 and t. 
*  Domestic Balancesheet: equals the product of  Domestic Debt in year t-1 and “Real” 
Exchange Rate Change between the years t-1 and t. 
* Competitiveness: equals the product of Openness in year t-1 and Multilateral Real Exchange 
Rate Change between the years t-1 and t. 
* Creditor Rights: measure the quality of the institutional setting affecting the risk of 
investment. The rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents, each with a maximum score 
of 4 and a minimum score of 0. A score of 4 indicates a very good environment for creditors and 
0 a very poor. The subcomponents are: contract viability/expropriation, profits repatriation and 
payment delays. Countries are divided into three groups: low, medium and high creditor rights. 
Source: International Country Risk Guide. 
Control variables: 
* Emerging Embi: equals the average of the stripped yields of the Emerging Markets Bond 
Index, Embi.  
Source: JP Morgan. 
* Appreciation (Appr): is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if Real Exchange 
Rate Change is negative and zero otherwise. Real Exchange Rate Change is never zero 
throughout our sample. 
* De facto classification of exchange rate regimes: From the 15 groups considered in Rogoff 
and Reinhart (2004), we group them in three groups: (i) fixed, which includes codes such as “no 
separate legal tender”, “pre announced peg or currency board arrangement”, “pre announced 
horizontal band” and “de facto peg”; (ii) intermediate, composed of “pre announced crawling 
peg”, “pre announced crawling band”, “de facto crawling peg”, “de facto crawling band”, 
“moving band” and “managed floating”; and (iii) flexible, including “freely floating” and   32
“freely falling”. The group “dual market in which parallel market data is missing” (7 
observations in our sample) is left out of the classification. A dummy variable is defined for 
each group. 
Source: Rogoff and Reinhart (2004). 
 
* De jure classification of exchange rate regimes: Every IMF member country is required to 
report and publish each year the stated intentions of the central bank yielding a de jure 
classification. From the 8 groups considered, we group them in three groups: (i) fixed, which 
includes “exchange arrangement with no separate legal tender”, “currency board arrangement”, 
“conventional pegged arrangement” and “pegged exchange rate within horizontal bands”; (ii) 
intermediate, composed of “crawling peg”, “crawling band” and “managed floating with no 
pre-announced path for the exchange rate”; and, (iii) flexible, including “independently 
floating”. A dummy variable is defined for each group. 
Source: Annual Reports of Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Rate Restrictions 
(IMF). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 